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plished. While he mentions the vagaries of Donald Nelson
in the War Production Board, Colonel Stimson had little to
do with those things in which American civilians participated
and which meant war to them. He does not mention congressional investigations, which then, as now, plagued administrators, or the control of those anti-trust prosecutions which
interfered with war production. He was left free by his
assistants for matters of highest policy, but other books must
be written before the full work of the War Department in
winning the war is appreciated.
But for all time Colonel Stimson has given us, modestly
to be sure, an example of what a great and intelligent, legally
trained advocate can accomplish for our country through
high-minded public service.
Julius H. Ambergt
LIBERTY AGAINST GOVERNMENT.

The Rise, Flowering and

Decline of a Famous Juridical Concept. By Edward S.
Corwin.* Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University
Press, 1948. Pp. xiii, 210. $3.00.
As Professor Corwin's book makes very clear, legal
systems may differ but natural law crops up whenever lawyers of any age or tradition are hard pressed to find a tool
to persuade courts that laws should not be enforced. The
natural law conception will not easily be downed, and we
find it recurrent in our own constitutional history, most
recently under the guise of "due process of law."
Even today when old conceptions of due process appear
to be strangled by a judiciary in revolt, we find the same
familiar notions arising again and again. Professor Corwin
finds origins of modern due process in Cicero's conception
of "right reason," and shows that from Cicero's day to our
own, right reason or its modern manifestation, due process,
is invoked by everyone with a grievance against law-making
majorities. Cicero of course was a businessman's lawyer,
and our own history of due process is largely a commercial
chronicle. However, today labor unions claim the right to
t
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carry on their business free of control under the banner
once borne by Justices Brewer and Peckham,' and minority
politicians invoke right reason as their champion when state
power seeks to restrict freedom of expression. 2 The Government of Puerto Rico, in an effort to free its people from
a mercantile serfdom, has recently gone beyond even the
forms of constitutionalism to challenge congressional legislation confining one of their basic industries as unconstitutional
"without reference to specific clauses in the Constitution...
a gross violation of the very spirit of free government...
[in conflict with] the glorious tradition of our system of
law."3

Briefly stated, from earliest to most recent times, lawyers have found natural law a marvelously amorphous substitute for chapter and verse as a tool of opposition against
popular rule. They have, by various invocations of "right
reason," "God's will," "common right and reason," or "due
process of law," deduced that what the state seeks to do to
their clients cannot be allowed.4
This book by Professor Corwin is an account of the
struggle of lawyers from Cicero to Coke and from Coke
through the counsel for the Jehovah's Witnesses today to
prove first, that judges are entitled to say that the .law
which is wrong is unenforceable, and second, to define
1.

See, for example, the argument of the Musicians Union in United
States v. Petrillo, 332 U. S. 1 (1947).
2. The leading case on the applicability of due process as a protection
of free speech is Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652 (1925).
3. Brief of Government of Puerto Rico, pp. 78, 79, in Central Roig
Refining v. Secretary of Agriculture, pending as No. 9769 in the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. The
issue in the case is whether Congress has or can restrict the
amount of sugar to be refined in Puerto Rico to approximately
one-eighth of the amount produced there.
4. To his appraisal of his clients' needs, the lawyer adds facile
scholarship-scholarship essentially historical-to veneer the "right
reason." Anyone could have the insight which the lawyer gathers
principally by osmosis from clients' needs. But it is judges who
are to be persuaded, and for them lawyers have a near monopoly
on the production of the acceptable type of scholarship. At this
we lawyers are frequently very good. As Thurman Arnold observed of the process by which procedural due process in the
Fifth Amendment was metamorphosed into reasons why railroad
workers could not have pensions and corporations were turned
into individuals, "only a short time ago nobody saw anything
strange or out of the way in the change. Scholars in law schools
proved that it was not a change at all, and were generally believed."
ARNOLD, THE FbLKL9ORE o CAI'ITALISM 34 (1937).
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"wrong" in terms of the needs of the client or class represented. As always Corwin's prose is felicitous, and he
describes with acquainted hand the consistent drive for a
bulwark against executive or legislative action. Three chapters comprising the bulk of his book relate that topic: the
rise, decline, and fall of natural law in Roman and English
experience; the efforts by attorneys to utilize natural law
for the protection of property rights before the Civil War;
and the successful culmination of this movement after the
Civil War when the Fourteenth Amendment became the great
protecting aegis for private property.5 The writer also tells
of the transition in recent years from due process as a protector of property to due process as a protector of civil
rights.
This is essentially an historical work, and its greatest
value as a scholarly contribution is in the pages dealing with
events most removed from our own time. It is because
controversies over natural law are a constantly recurring
emergence in our own constitutional system that Corwin's
book will have lasting value. These essays, largely republication and revision of older works, come at a time when revolt against the earlier excesses of due process still rages.
Thus Corwin's work has relevance in dealing with problems
which lie beyond the horizon of the present volume. Though
he offers a few predictions, his readers may perhaps best
assess the prospective outcome of the present reconsideration
of due process of law by studying its origins.
Corwin's recording of the periodic impressions of the
natural law conception on the history of government holds
discernible implications. It may be read as indicating that
the problem of controlling the judiciary is not likely to disappear no matter how the phrase "due process of law" may
be restricted by interpretation. The reason for the present
aversion to the interpretation of due process which existed
during the first third of this century is that this interpreta5.

The account of Liberty into Property Before the Civil War in

Corwin's third chapter can most profitably be read in conjunction
with Graham, The "Conspiracy Theory" of the Fourteenth Anndment, 47 YALE L. J. 371, 48 YALE L. J. 171 (1938). Corwin's
chapter on Due Process After the Civil War may be studied in
conjunction with Hamilton, The Path of Due Process of Law in

THE CONSTrrUTION RECONSmERED 167 (Read ed. 1938); and in an
excellent work by one of Corwin's students, Twiss, LAwYERs AND
THE CONSTITUTION cc. IV-VII (1942).
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tion in many cases gave the judges a sort of roving commission against evil without, in the federal judiciary at
least, subjecting them to the check of elections. In a democracy there is a proper reluctance to leave unrestricted policy
making to life-time appointees. But we must recognize also
that this roving commission, this extreme judicial prerogative, exists not only in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments but in somewhat similar fashion whenever the terms
of the Constitutioh permit an almost unlimited range of
"interpretation."
It is inherent in any equation in which
judicial review is a factor. For as Corwin points out, John
Marshall, using as his tool the contract clause, started
toward the same goals at which another century arrived
with due process of law. The basic Corwin thesis is that
Cicero's "right reason" was bound to crop out in our Constitution as an inevitable response of minority attorneys to
popular government. Given the inventiveness of the legal
profession, the choice of the particular clause scarcely
mattered.
These essays remind that due process or its equivalent
can be everybody's friend as well as everybody's enemy. The
reminder is significant because the reaction against the
grotesque excesses indulged in to insulate property against
community responsibility in the first thirty-six years of this
century could result in the destruction of substantive due
process of law as a device for judicial control of legislation.
Without considering whether such destruction would be
desirable, if it comes at all it should be based upon thoughtful appraisal of all of the consequences; and Corwin's essays
give breadth to the range of those consequences. He shows
that a majority of the present Court has given Justice
Holmes' doctrine of due process a clear victory over that of
Justice Sutherland, and fairly well ended judicial suzerainty
over economic legislative action. But today's majority has
reshaped, without abandoning, the power Sutherland used
and Corwin recounts the theories by which due process has
been moved as an obstacle to legislation from the economic
to the civil liberties zone of the law.
Corwin has not taken as his province the most vigorously disputed of the current judicial debates concerning
the reach of the due process clause. But one use for this
kind of historical study is as an aid in analyzing problems
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outside its specific scope and the major current issue may
be subjected to brief appraisal.
As has been noted, the revolt against older notions of
due process has generally relaxed the control of the Supreme
Court over regulatory legislation. But four Justices of the
present Court, Justices Black, Douglas, Murphy and Rutledge,
would carry the revolt still further. These dissenters, in
capsule, say that there never should have been any substantive due process in the conventional sense. They say
that the Fourteenth Amendment was meant to be a shield
for civil rights and that the Court has departed from the
plain historical truth. They would reinstate what they conceive to be that truth, that the Fourteenth Amendment was
intended to establish the Bill of Rights as a limitation upon
the states.
This is a minority conception,. but four man dissents
have a way of becoming law. One may be convinced by
the historical soundness of this minority interpretation of
the Fourteenth Amendment, and still reject it as impracticable. Consider, for example, the clauses of the Fifth aid
Seventh Amendments requiring grand jury indictments and
civil jury trials. Perhaps the states could have been bound
by these provisions if they had accepted them in 1868; but
there can be vested error and the proposed change comes
too late. We are eighty years and one hundred million people
away from the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. With
respect to such comparatively trivial things our ways have
jelled, and it is hard to imagine any good reason for pressing the grand jury on states that do not want it7 or cluttering small claims courts with twelve good men and true.
6.

These minority views are stated in Adamson v. California, 332

U. S. 46, 68 (1947).

7. If four Justices say that the Fourteenth Amendment requires
the application of the entire Bill of Rights to the States, then the
states may well look to see what their own problems will be if
the addition of a fifth vote turns dissent into law. The Federal
Bill of Rights include some twenty-one different rights, of which

twenty are already guaranteed, in the Constitution at least, by
the State of Indiana.

(Of course differences in phraseology

occur. Thus the Indiana equivalent of "due process of law" is
"due course of law." IND. CONST. Art. I § 12). The major impact in Indiana of bringing the Bill of Rights in toto into the

Fourteenth Amendment would be in the grand jury requirement.

The Indiana Cbnstitution provides that the General Assembly may
modify or abolish the grand jury system, Art. VII, § 17. This

privilege has been exercised by providing that all public offenses
except treason and murder may be prosecuted by affidavit.

STAT. ANN. (Burns 1933) § 9-908.

IND.
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The only seriously hard fought federal civil right not
now imposed upon the states by the interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment is the right to counsel in criminal
cases., The four dissenters would of course require counsel
whenever an accused desires, and it is almost incomprehensibfe that a majority of five can continue to say that civilized
notions of justice-the majority's conception of due process
-do not require an attorney for every defendant who wants
one, regardless of the state of his purse.9 This majority
view of due process makes criminal justice like a theatrical
production. You must pay to get in, and without the fee,
you don't see the performance. The controversy over whether all the Bill of Rights is a limitation on the states would
be well compromised were identical limitations against lawyerless trials imposed on the states and the Federal Government as a part of due process.0
8.

The text observation assumes that freedom from forced confessions and from cruel and unusual punishments are equally federal
and state civil rights under the Bill of Rights and due process.
For possible evidence to the contrary see the discussions in Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U. S. 143, 157, 158 (1944) (dissenting
opinion); and Louisiana v. Resweber, 329 U. S. 459, 466 (1947)
(concurring opinion).
9. In Indiana we have long since integrated the fullest notion of the
right to counsel into our own "natural law," and one of the most
powerful judicial expressions of this view has come from our
Supreme Court, which stated in 1854: "It is not to be thought
of, in a civilized community, for a moment, that any citizen put
in jeopardy of life or liberty, should be debarred of counsel
because he was too poor to employ such aid. No Court could be
respected, or respect itself, to sit and hear such a trial. The
defense of the poor, in such cases, is a duty resting somewhere,
which will be at once conceded as essential to the accused, to
the Court, and to the public." Webb v. Baird, 6 Ind. 13, 18
(1854). See also State v. Hilgemann, 218 Ind. 572, 576, 34 N. E.2d
129, 131 (1941); Knox County Council v. State ex rel. McCormick,
217 Ind. 493, 497-8, 29 N. E.2d 405, 407 (1940).
10. While the four dissenters agree that the Fourteenth Amendment
means the Bill of Rights to be a limitation upon the states, at
times they appear to divide on a related question, namely whether
this is the entirety of the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In Adamson v. California, 332 U. S. 46 (1947), Justices Black
and Douglas seem to accept the view that the Fourteenth Amendment means the Bill of Rights, no more no less; while Justices
Murphy and Rutledge seem to believe that the Fourteenth Amendment equals the Bill of Rights but reserve the possibility of adding
to it. However all four Justices uphold one right which is not
specifically referred to in the Bill of Rights. That is the right
not to be punished by vague and indefinite laws, so unintelligibly
drafted as to be incomprehensible. Winters v. New York, 333
U. S. 507 (1948), well annotated in Note, 23 IND. L. J. 272 (1948).
Yet the right to be governed by laws which are not utterly unintelligible is one not mentioned in the Bill of Rights. We must
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But this is aside from the main point. More important
is the appraisal of the underlying philosophy of the four
Justices which leads them to the conclusion that substantive
due process ("natural law") should be extirpated from the
Constitution. This philosophy stems fundamentally from
a basic belief in Democracy, from a conviction that the will
of the people is morally entitled to be the law of the land
except insofar as the Constitution pretty clearly restricts
that popular will. These Justices believe that due process,
as interpreted since 1890, is clearly too loose and too broad
a formula of restriction on the majority. To eliminate what
appears to them to be the excessive judicial discretion involved in this conception of due process, they would interpret
the Fourteenth Amendment in accordance with its historical
purpose-an incorporation of the Bill of Rights as a limit
on the states. And this irrespective of the fact that the inclusion of some minor parts of the Bill of Rights would be
extremely burdensome on the states."
Corwin's book will leave his readers with the gravest
doubt as to whether the dissenting Justices can possibly suc-

11.

conclude that the four Justices are not completely at odds; they
seem to agree that the Bill of Rights does not represent all of
one's civil rights in every circumstance.
Mr. Justice Rutledge has expressed his reasons for insistence
upon inclusion of the entire Bill of Rights as a limitation upon
the states as follows:
I do not think it can be demonstrated that state
systems, freed of the Bill of Rights' "inconveniences,"
have been more fair, just, or efficient than the federal
system of administering criminal justice, which has never
beenNotwithstanding
clear of their restraints.
Betts v. Brady, 316 U. S. 455, and
its progeny, I cannot imagine that state denial of the right
to counsel beyond that permissible in the federal courts
or indeed of any other guaranty of the Sixth Amendment
could bring an improvement in the administration of
justice.
The guaranties seemingly considered most obstructive
to that process are those of the Fifth Amendment requiring presentment or indictment of a grand jury and securing the privilege against self-incrimination; the rights to
jury trial and to the assistance of counsel secured by the
Slxth Amendment; and the requirements relating to suits
at common law of the Seventh Amendment. Whatever
inconveniences these or any of them may be thought to
involve are far outweighed by the aggregate of security
to the individual afforded by the Bill of Rights. That
aggregate cannot be secured, indeed it may be largely defeated, so long as the states are left free to make broadly
selective application of its protections.
In Te Oliver, 68 S. Ct. 499, 511, n.9 (1948).
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ceed in their underlying effort. His study dictates the conclusion that even though the dissenters should be successful
in respect to the Bill of Rights, it is probable their victory
would be only for the day. True, Corwin's history shows
that natural law conceptions may be successfully rejected,
and the complete supremacy of the legislature upheld; for
as his study demonstrates, the English have substantially
done this. But the English have no practice of judicial review at all. The appeal of the unwritten truth has been
consistently strong in our history. Corwin's study will confirm for his readers the firm belief that while it may be regrettable, natural law will keep bobbing up in some corner
of the American constitutional system no matter how it may
be treated at any given moment. Lawyers are too firmly ingrained with a faith that they can determine eternal verities
to make it likely that they will stop trying in the face of
setbacks.
John P. Frank-f
STATE CONTROL OF BUSINESS THROUGH CERTIFICATES OF CON-

VENIENCE AND NECESSITY. By Ford P. Hall.* Bloomington: Bureau of Government Research, Department of
Government, Indiana University, 1948. Pp. 154.
This little monograph brings up to date an article Professor Hall wrote on Certificateg of Convenience and Necessity almost twenty years ago in the MICHIGAN LAW REvIEw. 1
Like its predecessor, the present study collects and discusses
the statutes, court cases and commission decisions bearing
on the major aspects of state control of business by means
of the certificate of convenience and necessity, an instrument
which is used today for regulating business in every state
but Delaware. A certificate can be roughly defined as a
legislative grant of quasi-monopolistic power to a particular
kind of business. The theory is that public regulation has
been substituted for the competitive forces of the market
place either at the instance of the public or the business itself. The theory further is that in return for this grant of
t
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